The theoretical models introduced in the lectures will be applied in classes devoted to case studies of specific industries and to some antitrust court cases. Readings and class discussions will provide background and introduction to a variety of topics, many of which will be covered in lecture in greater depth. The theoretical models introduced in the lectures will be supplemented with case studies of specific industries. An introduction to Competition Policy issues will also be discussed. Read more information on levels in our FAQs. Please see Fees and payments.
For more information on exams and credit, read Teaching and assessment. The goals of the course include development of intuition for pricing and other strategic behaviour by firms, and development of skills for analysis of formal models. It will provide the essential knowledge required to pursue the answer to fundamental questions such as: Why are markets organized the way they are?
How do the ways in which a market is organized affect firms' behaviour? How does the behaviour of firms affect the structure of markets and market outcomes? The course also aims to deliver a higher level understanding of predatory pricing, cartel stability, the role of non-price competition, and the evolution of high technology industries.
A long-standing commitment to remaining at the cutting edge of developments in the field has ensured the lasting impact of its work on the discipline as a whole.
It is a leading research department, consistently ranked in the top 20 economics departments worldwide. List of Members Program Working Papers , in chronological order. The Program on Industrial Organization IO was founded in , and grew steadily under the leadership of Nancy Rose , who led the program from its inception until Jonathan Levin served as program director from until ,when he became dean of the Stanford Graduate School of Business and was succeeded by Liran Einav.
Program meetings were known for many years for their nontraditional "discussant presents" format, although in recent years they have more often adhered to the traditional "author presents" model. This report begins with a brief summary of general developments in the last three decades in the range and focus of program members' research, then discusses specific examples of recent work.
When the program was launched in the early s, two developments had profoundly shaped IO research. One was development of game-theoretic models of strategic behavior by firms with market power, summarized in Jean Tirole's classic text-book. Then came development of econometric methods to estimate demand and supply parameters in imperfectly competitive markets. Founding program members including Timothy Bresnahan, 2 Ariel Pakes, 3 and Robert Porter 4 played a key role in advancing this work.
Underlying both approaches was the idea that individual industries are sufficiently distinct and industry details sufficiently important that one needs to focus on specific markets and industries in order to test specific hypotheses about consumer or firm behavior, or to estimate models that could be used for counterfactual analysis, such as analysis of a merger or regulatory change. The econometric developments in the field, which emphasized structural modeling of demand and supply, ran somewhat counter to the trend in other fields toward the search for natural experiments to illuminate the causal effects of policy changes.
There were, to be sure, some points of overlap with neighboring fields. In the last decade, the scope of program members' research has broadened to encompass more industries and new topics. While studies of traditional manufacturing, service, and retail settings remain an important focus, there has been a rapid growth of research on sectors such as health care, 5 education, 6 financial markets, 7 and the media.
We analyzed all NBER working papers since on which at least one author was an IO program affiliate, then computed the share of these papers that were cross-listed with another program. We considered only programs in which at least 5 percent of the papers by IO researchers were cross-listed. It shows an interesting evolution of cross-listing behavior in the last 15 years.
While productivity remains a nontrivial focus of work in IO, there has been a remarkable increase in the share of IO papers cross-listed in other fields of applied microeconomics. This started in the early s in the context of environmental regulation and energy — especially electricity — markets, and continued in the last decade with a sharp rise in research on health care markets, insurance markets, labor markets, and on topics that overlap with public economics.
While the cross-listing rate with programs other than PRIE was nearly zero in the program's first decade, today nearly 20 percent of IO program papers are cross-listed with Public Economics, 20 percent with Health Care, 15 percent with Environment and Energy Economics, and 10 percent with Labor Studies. We think that two general forces have contributed to this new pattern, which in keeping with the program's emphasis one may label as supply and demand. On the supply side, econometric methods for studying imperfect completion have matured: From initial "test cases" using retail scanner data to estimate demand and supply for consumer products such as breakfast cereal and other grocery items, these methods increasingly are applied to more complex products such as health insurance, primary schooling, consumer loans, media consumption, and financial products.
The explosion of available data from private sector firms and markets has paralleled and facilitated this expansion.
Rather, it is the market rules that foster competition on speed by prioritizing trades based on their arrival time rather than their price. This point is sometimes contested in health insurance markets because hospitals and health care providers similarly enjoy considerable market power, and a dominant health insurer may enjoy the ability to negotiate favorable prices, lowering costs for consumers. Many recent papers by IO program members have studied this situation. Founding program members including Timothy Bresnahan, 2 Ariel Pakes, 3 and Robert Porter 4 played a key role in advancing this work. This course will focus on understanding the way firms make decisions and the effects of those decisions on market outcomes like prices, quantities, the type of products offered, and social welfare. This possibility has attracted attention from the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulators. One example of research in this area concerns the market for internet search advertising.
On the demand side, there has been a large shift in many markets, such as electricity and health care, toward regulated competition. Some of these changes have grown out of changes in U. At the same time, there has been an increasing appreciation of the importance of market power in a wide range of industries, such as health care, financial services, retailing, and media. Indeed, these changes continue to be some of the most significant in the U.
We have chosen these examples to underscore the broadening spectrum of industries and topics addressed by program members and the variety of approaches and tools being used to study competition and markets. These examples are not meant to be a summary of the much broader scope of research by program affiliates.
All of the recent working papers by program affiliates may be found at www.
GIULIANO MUSSATI Why do mergers occur, which are their effects on social welfare Studies in Industrial Organization Mergers, Markets and Public Policy. Series: Studies in Industrial Organization, Vol. Connor, John M. Market Integration in the European Community . Mergers, Markets and Public Policy.
In each case, private insurers compete under market rules that regulate contract features, pricing, and risk adjustment. Larger employers frequently also sponsor health plan choice, again creating an environment of managed competition. These developments raise important questions about market power, market design, and asymmetric information. Competition has been a central concern because health insurance markets are heavily concentrated.
In the California Health Insurance Exchange, four insurers have 95 percent of the market. Insurer concentration is even higher in many state exchanges and Medicare Advantage regions. In traditional markets, market power raises consumer prices. This point is sometimes contested in health insurance markets because hospitals and health care providers similarly enjoy considerable market power, and a dominant health insurer may enjoy the ability to negotiate favorable prices, lowering costs for consumers.
Many recent papers by IO program members have studied this situation. Their analysis highlights the importance of both traditional market power and bargaining power following a hypothetical merger. Holding hospital prices fixed, a merger raises consumer premiums, but in some markets, greater leverage in bargaining not only counteracts this direct effect but leads to overall lower consumer prices. Ho and Lee show how the magnitude of the competing effects varies across cities and market configurations. Community rating protects individuals with pre-existing conditions, and in a forward-looking sense protects healthy individuals who might in the future become sick, insuring them against what is sometimes called "reclassification risk.
Much of the debate around the ACA has centered on these dynamics and how best to address them. Handel, Hendel, and Whinston develop an elegant model that allows them to study this situation empirically, combining the classic adverse selection theory with detailed plan choice and claims data from a large private employer to estimate the key demand and supply parameters.
Among many interesting findings, their results suggest that higher-income employees would do better under health-based pricing, although not by that much, while community rating, as under the ACA, is hugely important for lower-income workers or for workers on something resembling a fixed income, which may be more representative of the current mix of ACA enrollees.
Both of these studies illustrate the power of using quantitative models. The theoretical trade-offs are well understood, but there is no clear idea of which effect is more important, so detailed data and an econometric model can help.
Our second example is drawn from financial markets and again illustrates the breadth of industry focus among NBER IO members and the diversity of methodological approaches.